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COMMENT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION-YOU TAKE (45% OF) MY
BREATH AWAY-Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1,
282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).*

I.

II.
III.

INTRODUCTION .......................................

107

THE M ORRISON CASE .............................
B ACKGROUND .....................................

109

A.
B.

IV.

North Carolina's Treatment of Occupational
Disease Claims .............................. 111
Apportionment of Damages in North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Law .................

114

1. The Aggravation Principle ................
2. The "Odd Lot" Doctrine..................

115
117
118

THE IMPACT OF MORRISON ...........................

A.

What Must the Claimant Prove in Order to
Receive Compensation for Total Disability?....

119

B.

The Aggravation Principle ...................

121

C.

Is Apportionment a Legislative or Judicial
F unction? ...................................
123
Can the "Odd Lot" Doctrine Coexist With the

D.

Rules Enunciated in Morrison? ...............
V.

111

CONCLUSION .....................................
I.

124

125

INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency, North Carolina textile workers
have sought relief under the Workers' Compensation Act' for the
* See also Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981), in
which the Court remanded a claim to the Industrial Commission to determine
what percentage of claimant's disability was due to occupational diseases; Walston v. Burlington Industries, - N.C. -, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1981), petition for reh'g
granted, _ N.C.

-,

-

S.E.2d - (1982), holding that the Industrial Commisson's

finding that plaintiff did not have an occupational disease was supported by competent evidence.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to 122 (1979).
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disabling effects of byssinosis or "brown lung" disease. * Their
plight has been the subject of a Congressional investigation 3 and a
Pulitzer Prize winning series in the Charlotte Observer."
In order for a claimant to recover compensation for an occupational disease under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act, he or she must either establish a claim based on a disease set
forth in the specific schedule of diseases listed in North Carolina
General Statutes § 97-53,6 or rely on the catchall provison, subsection thirteen of that article. Subsection thirteen provides a general
definition of occupational diseases:
any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section, which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside
of employment.0
In Morrison v. Burlington Industries,7 the North Carolina Supreme Court brought the "byssinosis" victim to the forefront of
public attention. The Court addressed the issue of whether a workers' compensation claimant may recover compensation for total
disability which results from the combined effects of a disease as
defined in subsection thirteen of North Carolina General Statutes
§ 97-53 and a noncompensable preexisting condition or disease.
(North Carolina General Statutes are hereinafter referred to as
G.S.).
This comment will examine the standards the North Carolina
appellate courts have developed to determine whether a workers'
compensation claimant is entitled to relief for an occupational dis2. Id. § 97-53(13) (1979). For excellent discussions of the definition of occu-

pational disease, see 1B A.

LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 41.30 (1978);

Note, Redefinition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable Compensation'
Statute, 16 WAE FOREST L. REV. 288 (1980); Note, Compensating Victims of
OccupationalDisease,93 HARv. L. REV. 916 (1980); Note, Workmen's Compensation-Development of North Carolina OccupationalDisease, 7 WAKE FoRST L.
REV. 341 (1971).

3. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee
on Educationand Labor, House of Representatives,96th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1979).
4. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1981, § IlI, at 4. (The initial article in the Charlotte
Observer series appeared on Feb. 3, 1980, § A, at 1.).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979).

6. Id. § 97-53(13) (1979).
7. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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ease under subsection thirteen, as well as the rules governing apportionment of liability in claims arising under the Act. Finally,
the Morrison decision will be considered in light of previous decisional law and standards adopted in the majority of jurisdictions.
II.

THE MORRISON CASE

Plaintiff worked in the spinning department of Burlington
Mills from 1948 until 1975, when she was no longer able to work."
During the mid-sixties the plaintiff first noticed a breathing problem and, at that time, sought medical treatment from a general
practitioner in her home of Erwin, N.C."0 Between 1965 and 1975,
she was hospitalized several times due to her breathing problem."
Plaintiff smoked between a half-pack and a pack of cigarettes per
day for about twenty years."
During the mid-sixties plaintiff was also treated at Duke Medical Center for phlebitis and bronchitis. In 1967, she had a vein
stripping operation and subsequent tests indicated that she had
diabetes."3
In April, 1975, plaintiff was examined by a specialist at the
University of North Carolina School of Medicine. He recommended that plaintiff relocate to another area in the mill where
there was less exposure to cotton dust. 4 Ms. Morrison was transferred to a different department, but had to leave after three
weeks; since she was required to stand for long hours, conditions
were intolerable.15
In August, 1976, the plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial
Commission, alleging that she had contracted an occupational disease as a result of exposure to cotton dust in her place of employment."6 Between July, 1977 and December, 1978, hearings were
8. See generally 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 59.20; Note, Apportionment of
Disabilities Is Limited Under the North Carolina Act, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 1123
(1976); Levine, Legal Questions Regarding the Causation of Occupational Disease, 26 LAB. LAW J. 88 (1975).
9. Record on Appeal at iii a, Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1,
282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2.
12.
3.
ii.
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held on plaintiff's claim.' 7 The Commission heard testimony concerning the possible causes of claimant's disability from three
physicians.
Dr. Henderson Mabe, a general practitioner, had treated
plaintiff since 1965. He testified that plaintiff was not able to work
on 24 April 1975, due to "chronic bronchitis, phlebitis of the leg
and obstructive pulmonary disease." 18 Dr. H. Sieker, Professor of
Medicine at Duke University and a specialist in occupational diseases, examined plaintiff in 1977. He testified that in his opinion
50-60% of her disability related to cotton dust exposure and 4050% to other factors."9 Dr. Battigelli, a specialist in pulmonary
medicine at the University of North Carolina, examined the plaintiff in April of 1975 (while she was still employed), and diagnosed
her as having "chronic obstructive lung disease, bronchitis in type,
in cigarette smoker with aggravation of complaints, on dust
2' 0
exposure.
In December, 1978, Commissioner Brown entered an award
finding plaintiff "totally disabled due to exposure to cotton dust
while in defendant's employment."' 1 The full Commission subsequently found that the plaintiff sustained a 55% loss of wage earning capacity as a result of an occupational disease and reduced the
award as provided under G.S. § 97-30 for partial disability."2
The Court of Appeals," one judge dissenting, remanded to the
Industrial Commisson, ruling: "if the workers' incapacity to work is
total and if the incapacity is occasioned by a compensable injury or
disease, the worker's incapacity to work cannot be apportioned to
other preexisting or latent illnesses or infirmities, nor may the entitlement to compensation be diminished for such conditions.""
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina first ruleds5
that the medical evidence was not "sufficiently definite to permit
17. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 47 N.C. App. 50, 266 S.E.2d 741

(1980).
18. Record at 8.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 47 N.C. App. 50, 52, 266 S.E.2d 741,
743 (1980).

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 53, 266 S.E.2d at 743.
Id.
Id. at 57, 266 S.E.2d at 745.
Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 301 N.C. 226, 271 S.E.2d 364 (1980).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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effective appellate review."' 2 1 The Commission was instructed to
take more medical evidence to determine what relationship, if any,
existed between cotton dust exposure and other infirmities." On
remand, the Commission adduced medical evidence in accordance
with the Court's order,'" and found that although plaintiff was totally incapacitated for employment purposes, only 55% of that incapacity was caused, aggravated or accelerated by exposure to cotton dust during the course of her employment at Burlington.
Again, the Commission entered an award based upon a finding of
9
partial disability.
On the second review,80 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reinstated the award of 55% partial disability. Over the dissent of
Justice Exum, s the Court held that the Commission had no authority to award compensation for total disability as this would
have been inconsistent with the Commission's finding that 45% of
the disability was due to disease not caused, aggravated or accelerated by the occupational disease. 2
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

North Carolina's Treatment of OccupationalDisease Claims

The General Assembly enacted occupational disease legislation
within the scheme of the Workers' Compensation Act 83 in response
to the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in McNeely
v. Carolina Asbestos Co.," in which a plaintiff suffering from as26. Id. at 223, 271 S.E.2d at 368.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court formulated three questions: (1) what percentage, if any, of
plaintiff's disablement, that is, incapacity to earn wages, results from an occupational disease; (2) what percentage, if any, of plaintiff's disablement results from
diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiff's occupation which were accelerated
or aggravated by plaintiff's occupational disease; and (3) what percentage, if any,
of plaintiff's disablement is due to diseases or infirmities unrelated to plaintiff's
occupation which were not accelerated or aggravated by plaintiff's occupational
disease.
29. 304 N.C. 1, 3, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463. Note that although the commission
entered an award for partial disability, Mrs. Morrison was found totally
incapacitated.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470 (Exum, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 123.
34. 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E. 509 (1934). McNeely contracted pulmonary asbestosis due to inhalation of asbestos dust at his place of employment. McNeely
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bestosis was denied compensation.3 5 As stated by a principal
draftsman, the Act was a legislative recognition that any burden
should not fall upon the worker, but upon the industry which cut
36
off the worker's natural life of usefulness
When the occupational disease section was first adopted,
North Carolina, like many other jurisdictions, provided coverage
for specified occupational diseases. Subsection thirteen, 7 as
amended in 1971, includes a catchall provision which makes compensable "any diseases due to causes and conditions which are
characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or
employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which
the public is equally exposed outside of the employment.""
In the leading case of Booker v. Duke Medical Center,3s the
Supreme Court of North Carolina redefined the meaning of occupational disease, 0 and examined the elements necessary to come
brought an action for damages in common law negligence, but the trial court sustained defendant's motion for nonsuit. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed, saying the claimant's remedy lay exclusively under the Workers'
Compensation Act rather than in a tort action. Id. at 572, 174 S.E. at 511-12. For
a short discussion of this case, see Note, Occupational Disease, 4 FORDHAM L.
REV. 147 (1935).
35. Id.
36. McMullen, Occupational Disease Compensation, POPULAR GOVERNMENT
4 (May-June 1935).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979). Subsection thirteen has gone through
several changes. Prior to the 1963 amendments, the provision afforded the right to
compensation for: "Infection or inflammation of the skin, eyes or other external
contact surfaces or oral or nasal cavities due to irritating oils, cutting compounds,
chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors, and any other materials or substances." The 1963 amendments inserted "or any other internal or external organ
or organs of the body" between ". . . nasal cavities" and "due to irritating. ..."
1963 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 965. The effect of the amendment was to broaden the
scope of coverage of subsection thirteen. In 1971, subsection thirteen was
amended to its present format as follows:
(13) Any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subsection
of this section, which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which
are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is equally exposed outside of the employment.
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 547.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
39. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
40. Note, Redefinition of OccupationalDisease and the Applicable Compen-

sation Statute, 16

WAKE FOREST

L.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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within the scope of subsection thirteen. 41 The Booker Court found
the occurrence of serum hepatitis in a lab technician to be due to
causes and conditions characteristic of employment; there was a

"recognizable link" between the nature of the decedent's job and

the increased risk of contracting the disease.42 The Court concluded there was a "distinctive relation"' 4 3 between decedent's em-

ployment and the disease serum hepatitis.44
The Booker court rejected the employer's contention that serum hepatitis was an "ordinary disease" of life and, thus, not com-

pensable under the Act. 45 The Court emphasized that the statute
does not preclude all ordinary diseases of life, only those to which
'6
the "general public is equally exposed outside of employment."
Proof of a causal relationship between the occupational disease and employment is necessarily based on circumstantial evidence and the Booker Court held that the following factors may be
considered by the fact finder:
(1) the extent of exposure to the disease or disease causing agents
during employment,
(2) the extent of exposure outside of employment, and
(3) absence of the disease prior to the work related exposure as
shown by the employee's medical history."
Applying the foregoing principles, the Booker Court agreed with
the Commission's finding that the claimant's decedent had con-

tracted a compensable occupational disease.
Shortly after Booker, Wood v. J.P. Stevens'" addressed the
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
42. 297 N.C. 458, 472, 256 S.E.2d 189, 198 (1979).
43. Id. at 474, 256 S.E.2d at 199.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 475, 256 S.E.2d at 200.
46. Id. at 468, 256 S.E.2d at 196.

47. Id. at 476, 256 S.E.2d at 201.
48. 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). Wood was the first case in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that byssinosis could be compensable
as an occupational disease. The Court held that the Industrial Commission erred
in taking judicial notice of the noncompensability of byssinosis under G.S. § 9753(13). In addition to Morrison, the Court has addressed claims based on byssinosis in Taylor v. J.P. Stevens, 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1980) (discussing
notice provisions as applied to a claim based on byssinoisis); Hansel v. Sherman
Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981) (remanding to the Industrial Commisson as the evidence was not sufficiently definite to permit effective appellate
review); Walston v. Burlington Industries, - N.C. -, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982) (denying compensation to claimant suffering from byssinosis when claimant also sufPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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problem of which of the several amended versions of G.S. § 9753(13) should apply to a given claim. The Court held that because
disablement which results from occupational disease is treated as
injury by accident, it follows that the employee's rights to compensation are governed by the law in effect at the time of disablement.' 9 Applying longstanding principles and following the dictates of the Act,50 the Court held legal disability equates with an
incapacity to earn wages rather than physical infirmity.51
While the decisions in Wood and Booker clarified and liberalized 52 the law of occupational disease in North Carolina, neither
addressed the question of whether an employee may recover benefits for total disability if his or her incapacity to earn wages results
from the combined effects of an occupational disease and a preexisting noncompensable disease or condition. Before examining the
impact of Morrison, it is necessary to review the North Carolina
law of apportionment 8s of damages in workers' compensation cases.
B. Apportionment of Damages in North Carolina Workers' Compensation Law
In the field of workers' compensation law, apportionment refers to prorating of liability between the employer and an employee himself, when a prior personal disability contributes to the
final disabling result. In addition, apportionment refers to the prorating of liability between successive employers" or between an
employer and a Second Injury Fund."'
Several states allow apportionment of liability where an employee has both a noncompensable prior disability and a subsequent accidental injury or occupational disease. Under most statfered from ordinary disease of life and history of smoking was, according to medical testimony, the primary etiologic agent contributing to her condition).
49. Id. at 644, 256 S.E.2d at 698 (1979).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979) defines disability as the incapacity, because of injury, to earn wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury in the same or any other employment.
51. 297 N.C. at 651, 256 S.E.2d at 701 (1979), citing, Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co. 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951) and Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E.2d 857 (1965).
52. See Note, supra note 40.
53. See supra text accompanying note 8.
54. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 59.20.
55. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-35 (1979) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-40.1
(1979).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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utes, the employee is entitled to that which he or she would have
been entitled had the earlier accident or occupational disease been
considered alone. 56 Since its enactment in 1929,"7 the North Carolina Act has included an apportionment provision.
§ 97-33. Prorating in Event of Earlier Disability or Injury.-If
any employee is an epileptic, or has a permanent disability or has
sustained a permanent injury in service in the army or navy of
the United States, or in another employment other than that in
which he received a subsequent permanent injury by accident,
such as specified in G.S. 97-31, he shall be entitled to compensation only for the degree of disability which would have resulted
from the later accident if the earlier disability or injury had not
existed. 8
Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co.59 discussed the application of the apportionment provisions of the North Carolina Act.
The claimant was blinded in one eye as a result of an accidental
injury arising out of employment. The Industrial Commission
awarded compensation for a 60% loss of vision, because the employee had previously suffered astigmatism causing a 40% loss of
vision. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that apportionment was improper and ruled tht the claimant was entitled to
compensation for total loss of vision in the eye. In so holding, the
Court noted that the apportionment statute was designed "to provide for deduction of prior compensable injuries and thus to prevent double compensation.""
Subsequent to Schrum, the appellate courts of North Carolina
have consistently rejected apportionment in cases in which the
statute does not specifically apply. These decisions have been
based on either the aggravation principle or the "odd lot""
doctrine.
1.

The Aggravation Principle

In Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.," the Supreme Court
of North Carolina first applied the aggravation principle. As set
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 59.30.
1929 N.C. Seas. Laws, Ch. 120.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-33 (1979).
214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938).
Id. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387 (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying note 74.
233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).
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forth by Justice Ervin, the principle is as follows:
when an employee afflicted with a pre-existing disease or infirmity suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment, and such injury materially accelerates or aggravates the pre-existing disease or infirmity and thus
proximately contributes to the death or disability of the employee, the injury is compensable, even though it would not have
caused death or disability to a normal person.a
The claimaint in Anderson sustained a back injury while he
was employed by the defendant. He was- diagnosed as permanently
physically disabled as a result of "either his injury... or by an
injury that predated employment."" The Industrial Commission
denied compensation, finding that the employee's disability resulted from a congenital condition rather than from the industrial
accident. In affirming the decision of the Commission, the Court
held that the Commission properly determined that the accident
"did not either of itself or in combination with a preexisting infirmity, cause the disability.""
Since Anderson, the courts have had little opportunity to develop the aggravation principle. In Kennedy v. Martin Marietta
Chemicals," the Court of Appeals upheld an award of death benefits,s7 finding that "diminished oxygen supply combined with decedent's arteriosclerotic heart disease caused the fatal heart attack""
claimant suffered while at work. Likewise, in Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co.,6" the Court of Appeals ruled that the Industrial Commission erred in reducing a claimant's disability from 35% to 10%
since 25% was attributable to a preexisting back condition. Apportionment was held to be improper where the preexisting condition
was acted upon by a subsequent injury which precipitated the
63. Id. at 374, 64 S.E.2d at 267. See generally Levine, supra note 8; IA A.
supra note 2, § 1220.
64. 233 N.C. 372, 373, 64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951).
65. Id. at 375, 64 S.E.2d at 267.
66. 34 N.C. App. 177, 237 S.E.2d 542 (1977).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 provides for payment of death benefits.
68. 34 N.C. App. 177, 182, 237 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1977). In Kennedy, the court
affirmed the Commisson's finding that a sudden deprivation of oxygen accelerated
or aggravated claimant's preexisting heart condition, thereby triggering the heart
attack which resulted in his death. The court in so holding applied the aggravation principle without actually noting the Anderson decision.
69. 27 N.C. App. 254, 218 S.E.2d 876 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 289
N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 466 (1979).
LARSON,

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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disability.70
The aggravation principle has also been applied by the Court
of Appeals in the context of an occupational disease claim. In Self
V.Starr Davis,7 ' the Court of Appeals found asbestosis accelerated
and contributed to death from a brain tumor. Relying on an earlier
decision of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals held that
while the tumor itself was not aggravated or accelerated by asbestosis, the claimant's decedent's death was. While asbestosis was
not the sole cause of death, the Court awarded benefits because it
accelerated or contributed to the death of the employee.
In summary, prior to Morrison, the courts applied the aggravation principle to determine whether a preexisting physical condition combined with an injury by accident or occupational disease
to produce disability. Under the pre-Morrisonstandard, it was not
necessary that the industrial accident or occupational disease be
medically related to, or that it medically aggravate, the claimant's
preexisting physical condition. So long as the occupational disease
or injury by accident combined with the preexisting physical condition to produce disability, apportionment was improper.
2.

The "Odd Lot" Doctrine

In addition to the aggravation principle applied in Anderson,
the Courts have adopted the "odd lot" doctrine as a basis of
awarding total disability benefits to the claimant who is unable to
earn wages due to the effects of an industrial accident or occupational disease combined with factors of age and education. Application of the odd lot doctrine permits a finding of total disability
in a situation where a claimant is not altogether incapacitated for
any kind of work, but is nonetheless so handicapped that he will be
unable to obtain regular employment in any well-known branch of
the competitive labor market.73 The rationale underlying the application of the doctrine is that the employer takes the employee as
74
he is.

70. Id. at 258, 218 S.E.2d at 879.
71. 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1971).
72. Id. at 699, 187 S.E.2d at 469, relying on Wyatt v. Sharp, 239 N.C. 655, 80
S.E.2d 762 (1954).
73. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 57.51; House v. State Accident Insurance
Fund, 20 Or. App. 150, 157, 530 P.2d 872, 875 (1975).
74. Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253, 256, 189 S.E.2d
804, 807 (1972).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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The odd lot doctrine, while not specifically recognized by that
name, was applied by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the
recent case of Little v. Anson County Schools Food Services." In
Little, a school janitor was injured when she fell over a mop bucket. Because of her limited educational background and advanced
age, she was determined by the Commission to be unqualified to
obtain gainful employment. The Court ruled that the Commission
should have considered the factors of age and education in determining whether to grant benefits for total disability, indicating
that benefits should not be apportioned between incapacity due to
the job-related injury and incapacity due to age and education."
The Little decision is consistent with the earlier Court of Appeals
holding in Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp.,7" which upheld

an award of total disability to a claimant whose 40% incapacity
due to silicosis combined with factors of age and lack of education.
The "odd lot" doctrine, therefore, is in accord with the legal definition of disability, the plaintiff's incapacity to earn wages.
Against the background of a developed case law in the area of
apportionment, and a redefinition of occupational disease as enunciated in Booker, the Supreme Court in Morrison addressed the
question of whether apportionment is proper in the context of an
occupational disease claim.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF MORRISON

Morrison is significant because it is the first case in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the application of apportionment to occupational disease claims arising under G.S. §
97-53(13). Before considering the significant questions addressed
by the Court, it is important to note that 55% of the claimant's
inability to work was found by the Industrial Commisson to have
been caused in part by "chronic obstructive lung disease"' and in
part by other physical infirmities "not caused, aggravated or accel75. 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978); see Note, Using Age, Education and
Work Experience to Determine Disability, 15 WAKz FORzST L. REv. 570 (1979).
76. 295 N.C. at 532-33, 246 S.E.2d at 746-47.
77. 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
78. 304 N.C. 1, 4, 282 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1981). As noted by Justice Exum in

Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 62, 283 S.E.2d 101, 111 (1981), "chronic
obstructive lung disease" is a disease which ultimately causes a worker to be incapable of work. The disease in its ultimate disabling form may have many components, including bronchitis, asthma, emphysema, and byssinosis.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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erated by an occupational disease. '"'' The Commission found these
other infirmities "disabling in and of themselves" 80 and the Court
deferred to this finding. 1
In response to the plaintiff's contention that the Act permits
no apportionment when an occupational disease combines with a
preexisting noncompensable condition or disease to produce total
disability, the Court held apportionment was proper and sought to
reconcile prior case law with its holding. The Court's discussion of
principles applicable in occupational disease cases, however, raises
as many questions as it resolves.
A. What Must the Claimant Prove in Order to Receive Compensation for Total Disability?
Morrison outlines the elements a plaintiff must establish in order to recover under G.S. § 97-53(13). First, the claimant must
meet the requirements of the statute, as explained in Booker,8 2 by
demonstrating that she has a disablement resulting from an occupational disease due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment as distinguished from an ordinary disease of life to which the
general public is equally exposed."
Secondly, Morrison commands that the claimant show "the
extent of disablement resulting from said occupational disease, i.e.,
whether she is partially disabled as a result of the disease."" The
Court relies on the case of Hall v. Thompson Chevrolet" as authority for the proposition that the claimant must carry the burden of proof to show "not only . . . disability, but also its

degree."' 6
The Morrison Court appears to be breaking new ground, in
fact, because the question in Hall was whether the claimant's disablement was permanent partial or temporary total. The claimant
failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that he could no longer
79. 304 N.C. 1, 7, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1981).
80. Id. at 9, 282 S.E.2d at 464.
81. Id. at 9, 282 S.E.2d at 463.
82. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes
37-40 for a discussion of Booker.
83. 304 N.C. 1, 12, 282 S.E.2d 458, 467 (1981).
84. Id. at 12, 282 S.E.2d at 467.
85. 263 N.C. 569, 575, 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1965).
86. 304 N.C. 1, 13, 282 S.E.2d 458, 467 (1981).
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perform work he had done before the accident.8 7 In Morrison,
there was no question but that the plaintiff sustained a total loss
of wage earning capacity."s
By requiring the occupational disease claimant to show the
percentage of disability which is due to the occupational disease,
the Court adopts the defendant employer's argument that the "resulting from" language of G.S. § 97-29 and § 97-30 should be read
as "resulting exclusively from."'"
Thus, the Morrison Court creates a distinction between the
occupational disease claimant and the employee who sustains an
injury by accident. An accident need not be the sole cause of disability if the employment reasonably contributes to the disability,"0
whereas in occupational disease claims, the occupational disease
must be the exclusive cause of disability.
With respect to Brown Lung victims, questions of causation
are at best difficult to resolve."s It seems unclear why the plaintiff
who has satisfactorily shown total disability and a long history of
exposure to dust should also be required to come forward and establish that his disability is not in any way due to causes and conditions outside of employment. In effect, this test requires the
plaintiff to prove a negative. If the employer is the one to benefit
from the apportionment rule, should he not carry the burden of
showing that a substantial part of claimant's disability was the result of factors other than those existing in the workplace?"
87. 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E.2d 857 (1965).
88. 304 N.C. 1, 5, 282 S.E.2d 458, 465 (1981).
89. Appellant's Brief. at 15, Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1,
282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
90. Vause v. Vause Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951). See
Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 53, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981), where, in
following Morrison, the court notes that in cases of injury by accident, the employment need not be the sole causative force to render an injury compensable.
This rule of causation is not applied in occupational disease cases.
91. Martin & Higgins, Byssinosis and Other Respiratory Ailments, 18 J. oF
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 455 (1976); Imbus & Suh, Byssinosis-A Study of 10,133
Textile Workers, 26 ARCH. OF ENV. HEALTH 183 (1973); Bouhuys, et al., Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill Community, 154 LUNG 167
(1977); Schrag & Gullett, Byssinosis in Cotton Textile Mills, 101 AM. REV. OF
RESPIRATORY DISEASE 497 (1971). See also, 4A ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
205E.100, (R. Gray 3d ed. 1981).
92. This is the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Pullman-Kellog
v. Workers' Compensation Board, 26 Cal. 3d 450, 605 P.2d 422 (1981) which applied the California apportionment statute discussed at note 102 infra.
In Kentucky, the apportionment act provides:
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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The Aggravation Principle

As noted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.,9" the aggravation principle disallows apportionment when the effects of an industrial accident and
preexisting physical condition combine to produce death or disability.9 4 The Morrison majority seeks to reconcile Anderson by referring to the Industrial Commission's finding that the plaintiff's
occupation "did not cause, aggravate or accelerate" her other diseases and infirmities which caused a forty-five percent incapacity
to work and earn wages.' 5 The court views aggravation in terms of
aggravation of an infirmity;" that is, determining whether the occupational disease acted directly upon a preexisting condition. Yet,
an examination of Anderson and the law then and now indicates
that the aggravation principle to which Justice Ervin referred was
more likely aggravation of disability rather than aggravation of an
infirmity. As stated in Anderson,
While there seems to be no case on the specific point in this state,
In case of disability or death from silicosis, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, or any other compensable pneumoconiosis, complicated with tuberculosis of the lungs, pulmonary emphysema or other pulmonary dysfunction and there has been employment exposures to harmful dust or
industrial hazards reasonably competent to produce such accompanying
disease or dysfunction, there is a rebuttable legal presumption that all
resultant disability therefrom is work related and compenable, and compensation shall be payable as for the uncomplicated disease, Provided,
however, That the disease or dysfunction was an essential factor in causing such disability or death.
Ky. Rav. STAT. § 342.316(7) (1977).
As has been noted, where there has been exposure to harmful dust sufficient
to produce pulmonary dysfunctions, and they were associated with an industrial
disease, then it is presumed that all of the disability is work related and compensable. The defendant is not prevented from presenting proof, where the facts warrant, that the attendant pulmonary dysfunction was not work related. See Note,
Kentucky's Answer to the "Coal Black Shame"-A Critical Analysis of Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Coverage of Black Lung Disease, 59 Ky. L.J.
467, 476 (1970).
93. 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).
94. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20.
95. 304 N.C. 1, 15, 282 S.E.2d 458, 469 (1981).
96. The test formulated in Morrison refers to percentages of disablement resulting from disease or infirmities unrelated to plaintiff's occupation which were
accelerated or aggravated by plaintiff's occupational disease and percentage of
plaintiff's disablement due to diseases unrelated to occupation which were not
aggravated or accelerated by occupational disease.
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courts in other jurisdictions hold with virtual uniformity that
when an employee afflicted with a preexisting disease or infirmity
suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, and such injury materially accelerates
or aggravates the preexisting disease or infirmity and thus proximately contributes to the death or disability of the employee, the
injury is compensable even though it would not have caused
death or disability to a normal person."
As authority for this principle, the Anderson court did not cite
case law; instead, it relied on encyclopediae and a treatise on the
law of Workmen's Compensation." An examination of these
sources indicates that the better rule disallows apportionment to
pathology. Indeed, Professor Larson refers to the "exceptional
statute" whereby compensation is payable only for the percentage
of disability attributable to the accident."
The rule of apportionment enunciated in Morrison is difficult
to administer and may lead to protracted litigation as experts attempt to assign percentages of causation to nonindustrial factors.1 00 Nevertheless, if the Court insists on apportionment, adoption of tests used pursuant to state statutes'0 1 is preferable to the
0
Morrison formula. Under the California apportionment statute,' 2
for example, the crucial test is whether the nonindustrial diseases
would have caused any disability absent exposure to harmful sub97. 233 N.C. 372, 374, 64 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1951) (emphasis added).
98. The Court cited: 6 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1543(1)
(1957); 58 AM. JUR., Workmens Compensation § 247 (1948); and 71 C.J., Workmens Compensation Acts § 358 (1935).
99. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20.
100. See supra note 91. For an excellent discussion of the problems in the
diagnosis of byssinosis from the medical as well as legal viewpoint, see Examination of The Scope of The IndustrialDiseaseProblem Which Confronts Our Society: Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Human
Resources, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 162 (1977); R. Roblee,
Medico Legal Aspects of the Coverage of Occupational Disease Under Workers
Compensation: Changing Concepts of Causation and the Case of Byssinosis (May,
1977) (unpublished paper submitted to Professor Rombauer at the University of
Washington School of Law). See also Hyatt v. Waverly Mills, - N.C. App. -, 286
S.E.2d 837 (1982), in which medical expert would not assign percentages in determination of causation.
101. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 59.21.
102. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4663 (West 1971) reads: "In case of aggravation of any
disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only
for the proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease
which is reasonably attributed to the injury."
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/4
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stances.0 3 If so, apportionment is proper. This "but for" test is a
workable solution for determining apportionment.
Likewise, under the Florida statute, °'0 apportionment is not
allowed where there is no evidence of any percentage of disability
due to preexisting disease or condition.100 In contrast, the Morrison
court not only allowed apportionment, but ordered the Commission to find percentages in determining plaintiff's disability.
C.

Is Apportionment a Legislative or Judicial Function?

Another question Morrison raises is whether apportionment is
properly a judicial or legislative matter. As stated near the end of
the majority opinion, the Court is not "philosophically opposed" to
the result sought by the claimant, but the "expansion of the law to
permit such recovery is the legislature's prerogative . . ... 06' If
other systems provide any basis of comparison, the opposite is
true. As stated Professor Larson, "except in states having special
statutes on aggravation of diseases, no attempt is made to weigh
the relative contribution of the accident and the preexisting condition to the final disability or death."1
In states having statutes applicable to Morrison-type claims,
an employee with a prior disability receives for a subsequent injury
only what he would have been entitled to had the subsequent
(compensable) injury been considered alone.1 0s Of course, application of apportionment statutes to occupational disease claims
presents problems of proof not encountered in accidental injury
situations.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the apportionment provision within the scheme of the Workers' Compensation
Act.1 0 ' Arguably, the General Assembly did not intend that the apportionment provisions apply in occupational disease cases. When
G.S. § 97-33 was first enacted, occupational disease legislation had
not yet been incorporated into the Act. Yet, in 1975, when the apportionment provision was amended,11 0 no provision was made for
103. Pullman-Kellogg v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 26 Cal. 3d
450, 161 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1980).
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(19) (West 1981).
105. Cover v. TG&Y Store # 1331, 405 So. 2d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
106. 304 N.C. 1, 19, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981).
107. 2 A. LAmsON, supra note 2, § 59.22 (1978) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at § 59.21.
109. See supra note 57.
110. The 1975 Session Laws added "is an epileptic" after employee in the
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apportionment in occupational disease cases. Applying principles
of statutory construction, when an act is amended, that which is
not included in the amended version is deemed to have been considered and rejected by the legislature. 1 ' It is noteworthy that
Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp.' " was decided prior to the
1975 amendment and there the Court of Appeals rejected
apportionment.
As noted in Schrum,"'3 the General Assembly's purpose in enacting this provision was to prevent double compensation. The
Morrison-type claimant receives no other payments under the act
and, in fact, the defendant made no argument based on G.S. § 9733.114

Regardless of whether the General Assembly considered the
question of apportionment in occupational disease cases in 1975,
the present inquiry should be what that body may do to offset the
harsh result of the Morrison decision. The problems could be attacked through the enactment of legislation disallowing apportionment in G.S. § 97-53(13) cases, or adopting a "but for" rule of apportionment, similar to that enacted in California.
D. Can the "Odd Lot" Doctrine Coexist With the Rules Enunciated in Morrison?
As previously noted, Little v. Anson County Schools Food
Services'" firmly mandated that the Industrial Commission consider factors of age and education in determining whether an employee is totally disabled and entitled to compensation under G.S.
§ 97-29. The Morrison Court, in summarizing the law, stated that
when a preexisting, nondisabling, non-job related condition"' is
aggravated by an occupational disease, the employer must compensate the employee even though a normal person would not have
been disabled under the circumstances.
The Morrison majority seeks to distinguish Little because it
dealt not with occupational diseases, but rather socio-economic
second line. 1975 Seas. Laws, Ch. 832.
111. 2A A. SUTHmRLAND,

STATUTE8 AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J

47.23 (D.

Sands 4th ed. 1973).
112. 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
113. Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938).
114. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
115. 245 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
116. 304 N.C. 1, 18, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981).
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conditions.' " With the Morrison rule, a disability resulting from
the combination of preexisting conditions (age and education) and
an occupational disease is compensable, whereas the combination
of a preexisting disease and an occupational disease triggers an apportionment rule. No sound reason is given for this distinction.
By adopting the dual standard for the application of apportionment, the Court implicitly encourages the employer to favor
the Morrisons (diseased employees) over the Littles (those with
socio-economic handicaps).1 18 This result is at odds with the liberal
principles underlying the Workers' Compensation Act. Query
whether the Morrison claimant may recover an award for total disability by alleging inability to obtain gainful employment due to
factors of age and education?
V.

CONCLUSION

Morrison is the first case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has considered the question of whether apportionment is proper in the context of an occupational disease claim. In
allowing apportionment, the majority reversed a progressive trend
in the field of workers' compensation law.
The Morrison decision adds to the burden of proof required of
an occupational disease claimant, departs from the prior application of the aggravation principle in this state, and creates an artificial distinction between claimants suffering from preexisting diseases and those whose disability is in part caused by advanced age
or lack of skill. Finally, the Court usurps the legislative function in
ordering apportionment.
At its first opportunity, the Court should reconsider the Morrison rule of apportionment and reestablish North Carolina's progressive tradition in the field of workers' compensation law. As
stated by Justice Sharp in Booker, 1' the clear intent of the General Assembly in enacting subsection thirteen was to bring North
Carolina in line with the vast majority of states by providing com117. Id.
118. See Judge Clark's dissent in Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 27 N.C.
App. 254, 260, 218 S.E.2d 876, rev'd on other grounds, 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d
355 (1975), in which he states that the apportionment rule could lead to discrimination against the handicapped. Under similar reasoning, the application of apportionment against those with a disease but not those with a lack of education
could lead to discrimination against the latter group.
119. Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189, 196
(1979).
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prehensive coverage of occupational diseases.
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